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August this year marks the tenth anniversary of the publication of the 
celebrated Radcliffe Report, which enshrined what had  come to be 
conventional wisdom during the preceding quarter of a century, namely, 
that monetary policy is unimportant. According to the Radcliffe Com- 
mittee, the Bank of  England can exercise no effective control of the 
money supply. However, this is of no consequence since the money 
supply does not play a critical r61e in the economy. What really matters 
(para. 397) is “the liquidity position of financial institutions and of firms 
and people desiring to spend on real resources.” 
Since the 1950s, the testing of hypotheses against the facts has in- 
creasingly  characterized  both  government  and  academic  economic 
studies. Yet, the views expressed in the Report were not accompanied 
by any analysis of the actual behavior of  the supply of money or the 
demand for money in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the Radcliffe Re- 
port does not contain any series at all on the quantity of  money. At 
the time, there was little empirical research on the influence of  money 
that could provide the basis for challenging the Committee’s conclu- 
sions. Today, the situation is very different. Extensive historical and 
statistical investigations have been conducted into the role of  money 
in the United States. These investigations give no support to the views 
expressed in the Rudclgfe Report. In the United Kingdom, too, as in 
the United States, the evidence is that the quantity of  money has a 
significant influence on the level of economic activity. 
The next four sections of this article summarize studies bearing on 
some of the issues posed by the Radcliffe Report: Can the central bank 
control the quantity of  money? Is there a direct relationship between 
changes in the quantity of money and changes in income? What is the 
link between monetary change and income change? What is the link 
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between monetary change and financial markets? Most of this relates 
to the United States, but in a final section some preliminary results are 
presented of a study of  British monetary experience since 1880. 
6.1  Can the Central Bank Control the Quantity of Money? 
For the United States, the answer to this question is clearly “yes.” 
Commercial banks, the public and the central bank all affect the quan- 
tity of money available to be held, but the central bank can dominate 
the other two. Three factors largely determine the supply of money: 
(1)  “High-powered  money”  (sometimes called the monetary base) 
is provided in amounts determined by the central bank, to serve 
as “required”  and “excess”  reserves of the commercial banks 
and as coin and currency holdings of the public.  “Required” 
reserves relate to the legal minima that the banks have to maintain 
against demand and time deposits, while “excess”  reserves are 
the amount by which actual reserves exceed required. 
(2)  The ratio of deposits to reserves is determined by the banks in 
light of their legal (or customary) reserve requirements, expec- 
tations of currency flows and interest rates.  Given existing  fi- 
nancial conditions, an increase in reserves will induce banks to 
acquire earning assets, thus increasing their deposits and restor- 
ing the desired ratio of deposits to reserves. 
(3) The ratio of deposits to currency is determined by the public in 
light of interest rates, income and its preferences for holding coin 
and currency. 
In the United States, growth in high-powered money has dominated 
the long-term growth of the quantity of money, the deposit ratios play- 
ing a more important role in cyclical changes in the money stock. But, 
even then, their behavior does not negate the central bank’s control of 
the quantity of money over short periods because it can take action, 
if  it wishes, to offset the behavior of the ratios. 
An examination of the circumstances surrounding the major changes 
in the quantity of money in the United States over the past century 
reinforces this evidence of the close correlation between high-powered 
money and the quantity of  money over short periods. These major 
changes in the quantity of  money have been largely independent of 
contemporary  changes in business conditions and, since  1914,  have 
clearly been the result of decisions by the Federal Reserve System. 
Some economists  have argued  that central bank  control  of  high- 
powered  money  does not  confer control  over the total quantity  of 
money. They regard  an open-market purchase of  a certain class of 
securities by the central bank as  having its full effect when some holders 
of the securities are induced to sell them. But this is only the initial 169  Why Money Matters 
reaction of  the sellers. They sold the securities not to add to their 
money  holdings but as a step toward rearranging their portfolios in 
light of changed opportunities. The money they receive is a “temporary 
abode” of the proceeds from the sale, pending the purchase of other 
items. Money is serving its usual function of separating the act of sale 
from the act of purchase. Evidence shows that, by this process, the 
change in high-powered money will be translated by the reactions of 
banks and the public into a prompt and predictable change in the quan- 
tity of money. 
6.1.1 
The central bank’s ability to control the quantity of money does 
not, of course, mean that changes in it are necessarily the immediate 
objective of  monetary policy. The bank  may  have other objectives, 
e.g., maintenance of fixed exchange rates or of fixed prices of Treasury 
securities. In such cases, the quantity of money must be whatever is 
consistent with these alternative objectives. In the United States, cur- 
rent policy, for example, aims at keeping certain short-term interest 
rates within a range specified every three weeks at the Federal Open 
Market Committee meeting. The Committee instructs the manager of 
the tradhg desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to conduct 
open-market operations that will keep specified interest rates within 
the indicated range. If this produces too rapid a growth of bank credit, 
the manager is instructed to allow rates to rise above the range. If it 
produces too slow a growth, he is instructed to allow them to fall below 
the range. However, when the Treasury is attempting to issue coupon 
securities, maintaining prices of Treasury securities within a fairly nar- 
row range may take precedence over maintaining specified limits on 
the rate of growth of bank credit. In that event, current policy operates 
to raise the flow of reserves and, hence, the growth rate of the quantity 
of money above the desired rate in the absence of Treasury financing. 
As a result, there are periodic reactions by the Federal Reserve System 
to the cumulative effects of special regard on its part for the Treasury. 
These periodic reactions involve contraction of the flow of reserves 
and of the rate of growth of money-as  during the last three quarters 
of  1966, and since the end of  1968. 
On balance, while the Federal Reserve can control the quantity of 
money if it chooses to do so, over the past decade control has been 
exercised at best fitfully. Most of the time the growth rate has been 
inadvertent, a side effect rather than the direct objective of monetary 
policy. 
Much the same conclusion apparently applies to Britain. The Bank 
of England can control the quantity of money if  it chooses to do so. 
However, it has, in general, at least until recently, chosen to supply 170  Anna J. Schwartz 
whatever quantity of money is necessary to stabilize the prices of the 
public debt at those interest rates it considers desirable. 
An empirical  analysis of  what determines  Britain’s money  stock, 
corresponding to that for the U.S.  money stock, does not yet exist. 
One reason is probably the difficulty of  assembling detailed data for 
all commercial banks even yearly, let alone at more frequent intervals. 
Yet, such an analysis is clearly needed to supplement the theoretical 
analyses that have demonstrated the shortcomings of the assertion in 
the Rudclgfe Report that the Bank of England cannot control the quan- 
tity of money. 
6.2  Changes in Quantity of Money and in Income 
Two dramatic episodes in the United States have recently focused 
public  attention on the relation between changes in the quantity of 
money and subsequent changes in incomes, which are, of course, the 
combination of movements in output and in prices. 
One episode was in 1966. From April 1966 to January 1967 monetary 
policy was contractionary:  the quantity of money was not permitted 
to grow, following a year in which it had expanded at the rate of 6 
percent. Over the same nine months, fiscal policy was highly expan- 
sionary: the federal government’s (high-employment) budget’ shifted 
from balance to an $1 1 billions deficit at an annual rate, the deficit then 
remaining above that level for the rest of  1967. Yet, during the nine 
months from October 1966 to July 1967 there was a sharp slowdown 
in both production and prices. Production, which had risen 9.6 percent 
the preceding year, actually fell 2.6 percent at an annual rate, while 
consumer prices,  which were up 3.7 percent  in the preceding year, 
continued to rise, but at the lower annual rate of 2.4 percent. This 
episode, like many historical predecessors, suggests that within a few 
quarters after the onset of a reduction in the monetary growth rate, 
output will contract and the rate of price rise diminish, despite a highly 
expansionary fiscal policy. 
The second episode began at the end of 1968, when the growth rate 
of the quantity of money, which had been at the annual rate of 6.8 
percent during the preceding 23 months,  was reduced to roughly  3 
percent at an annual rate. In 1968, while monetary policy was highly 
expansionary, fiscal policy turned highly contractionary:  the federal 
government’s (high-employment) budget, seasonally adjusted, shifted 
from $16 billions deficit at an annual rate in the second quarter to a 
small surplus at the end of the year, with the size of the surplus esti- 
mated to rise by $5 billions in the first half of  1969. Economists who 
disregard the quantity of money anticipated a reduction in output and 
prices after the middle of 1968. None having occurred, they then fore- 171  Why Money Matters 
cast a slow-down in the first half of 1969 and an improvement in eco- 
nomic activity in the second half. In contrast, economists who stress 
the importance of  changes in the quantity of  money  anticipated no 
contraction of economic activity in 1968 or the first half of  1969 and 
forecast, if anything, a slow-down of economic activity in the second 
half of 1969. At mid-year, the forecast of the former group of economists 
had not been confirmed. This episode, again like many historical pre- 
decessors, suggests that the effects of a high monetary growth rate will 
persist for several quarters after it is reversed in raising the level of 
output and the rate of price rise, despite a highly contractionary fiscal 
policy. 
6.2.1 
Apart from these dramatic episodes, many systematic findings sup- 
port a close association between changes in the quantity of money and 
those in money income. For the United States, the correlation between 
year-to-year changes in the quantity of money and those in income for 
the 94 years from 1870 to 1963 is quite close. The corresponding result 
for the United Kingdom for the year-to-year percentage changes for 
77 years between 1881 and 1967, omitting war years, is, in fact, slightly 
better.2 Quarter-to-quarter changes in the U.S. money stock are most 
closely associated with changes in income when they precede the latter 
by two quarters. In principle, this association might be considerably 
misleading: the changes in money and in consumption might be com- 
mon consequences of associated changes in “autonomous” investment 
expenditure,  investment  expenditure,  that  is,  determined  indepen- 
dently of current business activity. In practice, this possibility turns 
out not to be true. A number of statistical studies indicate that money 
has an influence of its own and not merely as a disguised reflection of 
such expenditures, whose influence is generally less strong and less 
consistent than that of  money. 
6.2.2 
A recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has further 
documented the close association between changes in money and in 
income. A statistical test of the relative power of fiscal actions and 
monetary actions to predict quarterly changes in gross national product 
from the first quarter of 1952 through the second quarter of 1968 yielded 
results which indicated that the response of economic activity to mon- 
etary  actions, compared  with  that of  fiscal actions, is larger,  more 
predictable and faster. Measures of fiscal action tested included federal 
government (high-employment) receipts and expenditures and the dif- 
ferences between them. The conclusion of the study regarding fiscal 
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do not correctly indicate the degree and direction of such influence, or 
there was no measurable net fiscal influence on total spending in the 
test period.” Measures of monetary action tested included the monetary 
base and the quantity of money narrowly defined to include coin and 
currency and current accounts held by the public, and defined more 
broadly to include also commercial bank deposit (time) accounts. The 
conclusion regarding  monetary  actions was that there was a strong 
relationship  between  economic  activity  and  measures  of  monetary 
action. 
Another set of studies has examined a different aspect of the relation 
between money and economic activity. These studies compare the cy- 
clical patterns of the rate of change in the quantity of money and of 
general economic activity. Over the past century in the United States, 
peaks and troughs in the money series precede the corresponding peaks 
and troughs marking some twenty-odd cycles in economic activity, on 
the average by  17 months at peaks and by 13 months at troughs with, 
of course, much variability from cycle to cycle. A different comparison 
that may be more revealing for periods with sharp trends is between 
dates when the fevef  of the monetary growth rate changes (shifting from 
a high level to a lower level or from a low to a higher level) and peaks 
and troughs in general business activity. For this comparison, the money 
series leads, on the average by 7.5 months at peaks and 4.5 months at 
troughs, again, of course, with much variability. Similar comparisons 
have been made for countries other than the United States. These have 
not been as extensive as those for the United States but the results 
have been much the same. A third comparison that gives about the 
same result as the second is between turning points in the rate of change 
in money and those in the rate of change in income. 
These comparisons are, by  themselves,  not  conclusive about the 
direction of effect. What is described above as the peak of the money 
series feuding the subsequent peak of  the cycle could equally be de- 
scribed as the peak of the money series lugging behind the preceding 
trough of the cycle. Alternatively, both the money series and economic 
activity could be the common result of still a third variable, but with 
money reacting more rapidly. These and similar possibilities have, how- 
ever, been extensively explored.  There is much statistical evidence 
suggesting that they do not, in fact, account for the observed results, 
and that these are more readily explained as reflecting the independent 
influence of monetary changes. 
To summarize, cyclical studies indicate that changes in the monetary 
growth rate are a necessary and sufficient condition for changes in the 
growth of  income over periods covering the different phases of  the 
business cycle. Short-term changes in monetary growth appear to have 
a major impact on changes in output and only a mild impact on changes 173  Why Money Matters 
in prices. This is the opposite of the relation found for longer periods. 
Longer-period changes in money incomes produced by a changed sec- 
ular rate of monetary growth are reflected  mainly in different price 
behavior rather than in different rates of growth of output. 
6.3  The Link between Monetary Change and Income Change 
A change in the monetary growth rate creates a discrepancy between 
the actual money balances the community holds and the money bal- 
ances it wants to hold.  The actions the community takes to try to 
eliminate this discrepancy create the link between monetary change 
and income change. To explore the implications of this, it is first nec- 
essary to discuss the way people decide how much money to hold. 
6.3.1 
What  ultimately  matters to holders of money is the real quantity 
rather than the nominal quantity of  money they hold.  For the com- 
munity as a whole, the real quantity of money can be expressed in 
terms of the number of  weeks  of  output to which  it is equal.  The 
reciprocal of  this measure  of  the real quantity of money  is income 
velocity, i.e., the ratio of annual income to the quantity of money. The 
calculation of velocity is made at those prices prevailing at the date to 
which the calculation refers. These prices are the bridge between the 
nominal and the real quantity of money. Another way of expressing 
the real quantity of money is to deflate the nominal quantity by an 
appropriate index of prices. 
It has been shown that the real quantity of money the community 
wants to hold is determined by two main variables:  real income and 
the yield on assets alternative to money. The demand for money in- 
creases as real income rises, because the rise in real income makes 
possible larger wealth-holding and money is one form in which to hold 
wealth; and it falls as interest rates rise, because a rise in interest rates 
makes money a less attractive asset to hold relative to other assets. 
There is, then, some fairly definite real quantity of money that people 
wish to hold under any given circumstances. Suppose that the nominal 
quantity of money that people hold happens to correspond at current 
prices to a real quantity larger than that which they want. They will, 
then, seek to dispose of what they regard as excess money balances. 
They will try to spend, lend and give in gifts more than they are cur- 
rently receiving. But one man can reduce his nominal money balances 
only by persuading someone else to increase his. The community can- 
not spend more than it receives. The attempt to do so, however, will 
raise the volume of expenditures and receipts, leading to a bidding-up 
of prices and, perhaps, an increase in output. With no change in the 174  Anna J. Schwartz 
nominal quantity of money, the initial excess of money balances will 
be eliminated, either by a reduction in the real quantity available to 
hold as a result of the price rise, or by an increase in the real quantity 
desired as a result of the increase in output. 
In the opposite situation, if nominal balances happen to correspond 
to a smaller real quantity of money than people would like to hold, 
they will try to spend, lend and give in gifts less than they are receiving. 
As a group, they cannot do so. But their attempt will, in the process, 
lower expenditures and receipts, driving down prices or output. Even 
though there is no change in the nominal quantity of money, the initial 
deficiency in the amount of money balances will be eliminated, either 
by an increase in the real quantity available to hold as a result of the 
price fall, or by a decline in the real quantity desired as a result of the 
reduction of output. 
It is clear from all this that, in principle, changes in income can be 
produced  either by changes in the real balances that people wish to 
hold or by changes in the nominal balances available for them to hold. 
The evidence suggests that, in practice, changes in the demand for 
money (desired real balances) occur slowly or are the result of earlier 
changes in supply, whereas changes in the supply of nominal balances 
can occur and frequently have occurred independently of any changes 
in demand. 
6.3.2 
To describe the link between monetary change and income change 
does not mean that we know the process of adjustment in detail. The 
prevailing orthodoxy presumes that a change in the nominal quantity 
of money must have its impact first on the bond market, an increase 
in money raising the price of bonds and hence lowering interest rates, 
while a decrease lowers the price of bonds and hence raises interest 
rates.  These interest  rate  changes are assumed to reconcile  actual 
and desired money balances. The sequence of  events is then traced 
from financial to non-financial markets. The change in nominal inter- 
est rates is treated as leading to a change in investment expenditures- 
a qualification is often added: insofar as investment expenditures are 
responsive to interest rate changes-and  the multiplier effect of  in- 
vestment  expenditures  on  income  as ultimately  leading  to  further 
expenditures on consumer goods and capital goods. 
The prevailing view takes it for granted that changes in the nominal 
quantity of money are equivalent to changes in the real quantity of 
money, so that price changes resulting from monetary change play no 
part in reconciling the demand for money with the change in supply. 
Only changes in interest rates produce the reconciliation.  The more 
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terest rates, the less interest rates will have to change to achieve the 
reconciliation. Similarly, according to the prevailing view, the interest 
rate is the only link between monetary change and real income. The 
less responsive is investment to a given change in interest rates, the 
less will any given change in interest rates affect real income. If, there- 
fore, the demand for money is highly responsive to interest rate changes, 
while investment expenditure is unresponsive, most of  the change in 
supply of money will be absorbed by a corresponding change in amount 
demanded, with little effect on real income or prices. 
This was the view adopted by the Radclgfe Report. By implication, 
changes in the quantity of money are important only insofar as they 
lead to changes in interest rates that influence decisions to hold money 
or other liquid assets. Changes in market interest rates on the liquid 
part of total wealth relative to the real rates of return on  capital in the 
illiquid other part of total wealth are deemed to be the channel through 
which changes in spending are transmitted. Hence, interest rates are 
viewed as essentially the only market variable that reconciles the struc- 
ture of assets supplied with the structure demanded. Yet, no evidence 
exists showing that this approach is valid. The correlations between 
the level of or rates of change in interest rates, on the one hand, and 
rates of change in nominal income, prices, and output, on the other, 
are considerably worse than those between rates of change in the quan- 
tity of money and these magnitudes. 
6.3.3 
The alternative monetary analysis that has been replacing the Rad- 
cliffe view is based on evidence that a change in the quantity of money 
is followed by changes in both prices and output. The price changes 
are one channel of adjustment of  the real quantity of money to the 
change in the nominal quantity. Interest rate changes and real output 
changes are other channels. When actual and desired money balances 
are in disequilibrium, flows of  every conceivable sort may be affected 
in the process of altering stocks of financial and non-financial assets 
to restore equilibrium. 
On this alternative view, the particular mechanical sequence from 
money to bonds to interest rates to investment expenditures and, thence, 
to income is one, but only one, possible channel of transmission of 
monetary change to income change. There is no reason to suppose that 
it is exclusive. A discrepancy between actual and desired money bal- 
ances may also be eliminated by initial spending effects on all manner 
of goods and services. Such a discrepancy may affect expenditures on 
durable and non-durable consumer goods, investment in education, in 
financial assets of the wide variety available, including not only bonds 
but also equities, mortgages, life insurance, and so on, and in durable 176  Anna J. Schwartz 
producers’ goods. The effects are then further diffused as  demand shifts 
for current output of goods and services and new sources of productive 
services. The precise sequence of  transmission  may well vary from 
time to time because it depends on the initial points of impact of the 
change in money. However, the consistency of the relation between 
monetary and income changes argues that the initial effects are dom- 
inated by the more general diffused effects that monetary changes set 
off. 
To complete this account of the relation between changes in money 
and in money income, some discussion is required of the link between 
changes in money and the division of the change in incomes between 
price and output. The most widely held view of what determines this 
division is probably that it depends on the level of utilization of capacity. 
When there is much unemployment of  men and machines, an income 
change will be absorbed primarily by increased output, and prices will 
rise little. When there is high employment and high utilization of ca- 
pacity, the output change will be moderate and prices will absorb the 
rest of the income change. Some recent findings indicate that past price 
experience is at least as important as the rate of capacity utilization in 
influencing the rate of current price rise. A 5 percent rate of monetary 
growth tends to mean a more rapid rate of price rise and a lower rate 
of output growth if prices have been rising at 5 percent per year in the 
immediate past than if  prices have been stable. But past price expe- 
rience is itself related to earlier monetary growth rates.  Hence, this 
explanation implicitly makes the current division of a change in money 
income between prices and output a function of the earlier history of 
monetary change. However, the precise extent of the influence of ca- 
pacity utilization and that of earlier price experience is still under in- 
vestigation. Indeed, this issue of the forces determining the division of 
a change in income between prices and output is perhaps the major 
gap in our present knowledge of  monetary relations and effects. 
6.4  The Link Between Monetary Change and Financial Markets 
Monetary policy is often examined in relation to its effects on credit 
rather than on the quantity of money. The chief function of the central 
bank, on this view, is regarded as the control of commercial bank assets 
in the form of loans and investments, the terms of credit in the loan 
market and the yields on a few widely traded securities. The effect of 
monetary policy on the quantity of  money is not given special consid- 
eration. 
Yet, there are many reasons for believing that the concentration on 
credit aspects of central bank actions provides an unreliable indication 
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targets of  central bank  operations  reflects the view that the “first” 
round of circulation associated with asset creation by the banking sys- 
tem needs  special attention.  Spending consequences of  such a first 
round are assumed to exhaust the monetary effects of changes in assets. 
Loans to the private sector are deemed to play a crucial role because 
it is taken for granted that the transactions velocity of such funds is 
markedly higher than that of swaps of bank deposits for Treasury bills 
or other securities held by the public.  Alternatively,  stress on bank 
loans as the main channel through which banks affect spending some- 
times rests on the assumption that the market for credit is fragmented, 
so that borrowers denied bank loans perforce must abandon or post- 
pone investment plans they wish to finance. 
It is conceivable that the first round may exhaust the monetary effects 
of the change in assets. This would be the case if a change in the supply 
of money associated with asset creation just equalled a change in the 
demand for money. However, if  a change in supply produces a dis- 
crepancy between the public’s actual and desired money holdings, there 
will be future effects in subsequent rounds of circulation, which will 
escape the notice of a central bank whose targets are restricted to bank 
assets. 
In any event, the link between changes in reserves over short periods 
and the volume of particular earning assets is quite loose. The distri- 
bution of earning assets among liquid assets, other investments and 
loans is, in the first instance, subject to the banks’ control. Similarly, 
the link between changes in reserves over short periods and changes 
in interest rates and credit conditions is quite loose. Interest rates and 
credit conditions are the outcome of the interaction of demand and 
supply in markets in which the central bank may not participate or, if 
it does, may not be dominant. Bank assets in the form of loans and 
investments are a minor fraction of the total outstanding volume of 
credit. It has been shown that, in the United States, central bank action, 
measured by the rate of change in money, accounts only in part for 
the pattern of interest rates with respect to the peaks and troughs in 
general business, and explains only about a quarter of  the cyclical 
variation in the movements of  interest rates.  Clearly, central banks 
exert an important influence on credit conditions, but it is far from 
being controlling. 
Moreover, changes in the volume of particular types of credit or of 
total bank  credit, in credit conditions, in the level of or the rate of 
change in interest rates provide a poor basis for interpreting the stance 
of  monetary policy. However money is defined, the evidence is clear 
that it changes at very different rates than do particular types of bank 
credit or total bank credit. There is no unambiguous measure of credit 
conditions. They can be described only qualitatively in degrees of ease 178  Anna J. Schwartz 
or tightness, and the determination of what credit conditions are “ap- 
propriate”  is equally  amorphous. Since interest rates tend to move 
within a relatively limited range, a common fallacy is to assume that 
the top of the range is proof of tightness, and the bottom of  the range 
proof of ease. Yet, tightness and ease are relative, not absolute, terms. 
A  high interest rate when demand is strong may not be restrictive, 
while the same rate with weak demand may be highly restrictive. 
6.4.1 
Recent studies have  shown that,  while interest rates  are initially 
lowered by  increasing  the quantity  of  money,  this  action  produces 
income and price effects which will offset the reduction within several 
months. Conversely for decreases in the quantity of money. That is 
why we observe rising interest rates during business expansions as a 
delayed  consequence of a higher  monetary  growth rate  and falling 
interest rates during business contractions as a delayed consequence 
of  a lower monetary growth rate. The initial effects on interest rates 
of  higher or lower monetary  growth rates are temporary:  they  are 
swamped by the effects of the ensuing increase or decrease in demand 
for credit and the effects of  price  anticipations.  To  the extent that 
lenders and borrowers anticipate changes in the purchasing power of 
money, bond prices will tend to be lower and nominal yields higher 
when prices in general are rising than when prices in general are  falling, 
since the decline (or the rise) in the real value of the principal is a 
deduction from (or addition to) the nominal interest paid. Hence, cen- 
tral banks will be misled if they regard the level of or change in interest 
rates as an indication of whether their own actions are expansionary 
or contractionary. 
Though interest rates have some influence on the demand for and 
supply of money, and though there are undoubtedly some influences 
running from prices and output to changes in the nominal quantity of 
money, the weight of the evidence supports the proposition that the 
rate of  growth of the quantity of money is a relatively unambiguous 
indicator of monetary conditions. A sustained rise in the rate of growth 
of money means the central bank is creating a monetary expansion on 
its own or acquiescing in monetary expansion set in  motion by the 
other determinants. Likewise, a sustained decline in the rate of growth 
of  money means the central bank is creating a monetary contraction 
on its own or acquiescing in monetary contraction set in motion by the 
other determinants. 
In post-war years one target of Bank of England operations has been 
the clearing banks’ advances to the private sector. The object has been 
to control private sector borrowing by restricting to a given percentage 179  Why Money Matters 
figure the increase, over some stated period, in the banks’ advances, 
in order to hold down the demand for imports and domestic spending, 
both of which are assumed to be strongly associated with private bor- 
rowing. Recently, control of private advances has been exercised also 
as a means of curbing the quantity of money. Even if the banks hit the 
target-or,  to use a more exact metaphor, get under the ceiling-control 
of advances would still be a poor way to control the money supply. 
The links between advances and the money supply are too loose. To 
curb the rate of growth of the money supply, the essential requisite is 
control of the monetary base. This can best be done by Bank of England 
actions affecting the flow of  reserves to the banks. 
6.5  British Monetary Experience 
Reasonably accurate annual data on the quantity of money in the 
United Kingdom are available for 1880- 1967. Comparable annual data 
for money income, prices and real income are available for an even 
longer period. An analysis of long-period movements in these series is 
now under way at the National Bureau of Economic Research in New 
York, but at this stage only the basic data in the form in which they 
are being studied, not the final results, can be presented.  But, even 
from this elementary material, it can be seen that the evidence for the 
United Kingdom is broadly consistent with that for the United States 
on the relation between monetary changes and changes in other eco- 
nomic magnitudes. 
For a study of long-period movements, it is desirable to remove from 
the data, so far as possible, the effects of shorter-term movements of 
business cycles. A standard chronology of British business cycles dat- 
ing from the mid-nineteenth  century until the second world war has 
recently been extended into the 1960s. On this basis, it is possible to 
convert the annual data for the United Kingdom into average values 
of a series over the successive phases of business cycles, the expansion 
phase running from a cycle trough to a cycle peak, and a contraction 
phase running from a cycle peak to a cycle trough. The initial phase 
covered by the money series is the contraction running from a peak in 
1883 to a trough  in  1886; for the other series, it  is the proceeding 
contraction running from a peak in 1873 to a trough in 1879. The average 
values for incomes, prices and the stock of money are shown in figure 
6.1 plotted in the middle of each phase. 
From the chart it will be seen that there is clearly a striking similarity 
between the course of the lines for the quantity of money and for money 
income (the correlation is .972). It is, perhaps, not surprising to find 
the prices and the quantity of money curves moving so closely together 180  Anna J. Schwartz 
of  Money 
Fig. 6.1  Incomes, prices, and stock of money in the United Kingdom, 
1876-1965. 
(the correlation is .976). What may be surprising is that, despite the 
differences in long-period trends, there is an appreciable relation be- 
tween the levels of  money and real income (the correlation is .970). 
In addition to the absolute levels of  these series, it is helpful to 
examine their rates of change, as shown in figure 6.2. Rates of change 
are notoriously erratic. Yet, there is scarcely a movement of any size 
in the money stock line that does not have its counterpart in that of 
money income (the correlation is .742). The similarity between the two 
series does not reflect any spurious correlation arising from reliance 
on common data, and occurs despite independent errors of  measure- 
ment in the data underlying the two series. As in figure 6.1, the cor- 181  Why Money Matters 
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Fig. 6.2  Rates of change in incomes, prices, and stock of money in 
the United Kingdom, 1880-1962. 
relation of the rates of change in money and in prices (.798) is somewhat 
closer than that between the rates of  change in money and in money 
income. The two war-time peaks in the rate of change in money are 
reflected in the rate of change in prices. Real income possibly repro- 
duces the first war-time peak in a muted form but not that of the second 
world war. Omitting the war periods, the correlation between money 
stock and real income growth rates (.362) is not nearly so good as that 
between monetary and price change. 
The close connection between movements in Britain's stock of money 
and in money income recorded in the figures is an economic phenom- 
enon that must be explained in economic terms.  It is a relation that 
has persisted for as long a period  as there are data to examine, for 
cyclical as well as longer-term movements. Study of the data for the 
United States has revealed that monetary influences operate in subtle 
ways and with long lags, but with highly regular and understandable 
patterns. There is no reason to believe that British monetary experience 
is an exception to this conclusion. 182  Anna J. Schwartz 
Notes 
1.  Because actual current tax receipts and certain government expenditures 
(such as unemployment  compensation)  reflect the level of economic activity 
at current tax and expenditure rates, the measure of “high-employment”  gov- 
ernment receipts and expenditures has been devised to reflect the effect of the 
budget  independently  of  the reverse influence of  current economic activity. 
This measure shows the federal government’s receipts and expenditures that 
would occur if the economy were at high employment, a situation in which, 
but for frictions, all looking for jobs at the going wage rate would be able to 
obtain employment-in  the United States, considered  to be when 96 or 97 
percent of the labor force is employed. 
2. The actual figures are .70 for the U.S.  and .77 for the U.K. 